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While there is long history of social democratic governments disappointing the hopes and aspirations of 
their committed supporters (Miliband, 1986), there has been a sharp rightward shift in their policies and 
practice since the mid-1970s. Far from being associated with significant improvements in living 
standards for their working-class base, social democratic governments have delivered material outcomes 
little different from mainstream conservative administrations. Austerity budgets, privatisation, labour 
market deregulation and public sector retrenchment have been the order of the day in Australasia, Canada 
and Europe (Ross, Hoffmann and Malzacher 1987; Anderson 1986; Petras 1987; Roper 1990; Pontusson 
1992; Merkel 1993; Leys 1996; Navarro 1997). This chapter seeks to shed light on these trends by 
examining the case of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments in Australia between 1983 and 1996. 
The approach adopted is Marxist, focussing on how class relations and the logic of capital accumulation 
shaped the policies of these governments. 
 
We start by considering the way in which general practice of social democracy in recent years in all 
countries has been influenced by economic stagnation, globalisation and a general atmosphere of 
industrial and political passivity in the working class. As the basis for a later evaluation of the 
Government’s achievements, the second section provides a sketch of the Australian economy as it stood 
when the Australian Labor Party (ALP) took office in 1983 and a brief examination of the nature of the 
party itself. The distinctive features of Labor’s policies, particularly its Accord with the peak union 
federation, are examined in the third section, while the fourth assesses what Labor delivered for 
employers and workers. The final substantive section outlines the factors which led to Labor’s electoral 
defeat in March 1996 and hence the demise of the Accord. 
 
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S 
 
The Historic Role of Social Democracy 
 
Before analysing the ALP’s record in office, it is important to differentiate between social democracy and 
the classical social democratic project. Social democracy is a form of working class mobilisation 
reflecting workers’ recognition of differences between labour and capital and hence their consciousness 
of class differences, but also the belief that these differences can be managed, to mutual benefit. The 
essence of social democracy amongst workers is their aspiration to achieve improvements in their 
conditions of life, their lack of confidence that this can be achieved through their own direct action (the 
precondition for a revolutionary alternative) and thus their reliance on others to bring about reforms 
‘from above’ (Lenin 1963; Cliff 1982; Cliff and Gluckstein 1988:1-2). Within modern capitalism 
parliamentarism has been the dominant form of social democratic mobilisation, in the Australian case 
through the Australian Labor Party. A further defining characteristic of social democracy is the close 
relationship between parliamentary parties and trade unions, sometimes portrayed as “the two wings” of 
the labour movement. The institutional relationships between trade unions and social democratic parties 
vary amongst countries and have been undergoing changes. In Australia, Britain and Sweden, for 
example, many unions affiliate directly with the Labor, Labour or Social Democratic Party (Kuhn 1989). 
In other countries, such as Germany, formal affiliation does not exist, but union officials play important 
roles in the party at all levels. France presents another pattern again, with competing union federations 
associated with two significant social democratic parties, the Socialists and Communists. Despite the 
institutional differences, in all these cases there are fundamental similarities in the political relationships 
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between the leaderships of the key trade unions and the parliamentary parties. The operational division of 
labour, with the unions handling “industrial” questions and the parties being devoted to the pursuit of 
political power has been particularly important. 
 
Social democratic leaderships have characteristically justified their actions in terms of a fairly well-
defined and popularly understood social democratic project. The aim of the social democratic project has 
been to improve the well-being of social democracy’s working class base, in terms of its political and 
economic rights, especially to employment and decent incomes, within the framework of capitalism and 
the institutions of the bourgeois democratic state. During the postwar decades, full employment and 
income redistribution, with relatively high levels of taxation, have been regarded as central policy means 
to this end. The viability of the project has been based on two important assumptions: first, that in order 
to achieve full employment, workers would be prepared to moderate wage demands; and, second, that in 
return for social peace and economic expansion employers would accept some level of limited economic 
intervention by the state in the affairs of the private sector (either through public ownership of enterprises 
or, more commonly, regulation), together with some decline in labour discipline usually associated with 
full employment and a social welfare net. 
 
Explaining the Rightward Shift of Social Democracy since the 1970s 
 
The rightward shift in social democratic practice since the 1970s is often attributed by social democratic 
intellectuals and party activists to the idea that their governments have been “captured” by New Right 
ideologues who have perverted the social democratic tradition. Within Australia this has been the 
dominant interpretation of the record of the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments by Stilwell (1986), 
Pusey (1991), Green and Wilson (1996), Hampson (1996), Langmore (1996) and Fairbrother, Svensen 
and Teicher (1997). Hampson (1996), for example, argues that the Labor Government, under the 
influence of political opportunists within its own ranks and consistent lobbying by Treasury and 
employer groups, adopted a neo-liberal economic policy approach which shifted the burden of economic 
adjustment onto workers. Instead of following economic rationalist (the Australian term for neo-liberal) 
precepts, Hampson suggests, Labor should have adopted an interventionist and progressive industry 
policy agenda to correct the shortfall in manufacturing investment which plagues Australian capitalism 
and to redirect some of the benefits of restructuring to workers. This would in turn have maintained its 
electoral popularity and prevented its demise in the 1996 elections. 
 
The notion that the ALP’s rightward shift in the 1980s was due to the ‘bad guys’ winning the factional 
battle does have some basis in fact. Right-wing factions did win out in the Australian, New Zealand and 
British labour parties in the 1980s. Figures such as Roger Douglas in New Zealand and Tony Blair in the 
UK did do much to promote policies which would previously have been regarded as anathema within 
their parties. However, a focus on the victory of particular individuals or factions is incapable of 
explaining why social democracy has tended to adopt right-wing policies everywhere that it has a 
sizeable base. It also fails to account, in the case of Australia at least, for Labor’s continued adherence to 
such policies when they were, as Hampson puts it, ‘self-defeating’, except, perhaps, in terms of some 
awful collective misjudgment on the part of its policy makers and advisers.  
 
A more useful approach starts with an examination of the reformist project’s general limitations and, 
more specifically, its weaknesses in the conditions of the 1980s and 1990s. Social democracy ultimately 
betrays its supporters not because the left of the party loses policy debates, but because of factors internal 
to the processes of capital accumulation itself. The rightward shift in social democratic governments 
since the early 1970s can be understood, more specifically, as a consequence of capitalism’s tendency to 
economic crisis, the reaction of governments the world over to accelerated globalisation, and the relative 
lack of political and industrial self-confidence amongst workers since the upsurge of working class 
militancy of the 1960s and 1970s abated. 
 
Capitalist crisis 
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Reformism in government consistently pursues the interests of capital, with least internal stress when it is 
under least pressure from its working class base (Miliband, 1986, 1969). In the period of the long postwar 
boom, this was not necessarily inconsistent with steady improvements in working-class living standards 
and an expansion of the welfare state. However, in the specific context of the 1980s and 1990s, relative 
economic stagnation in Europe and Australasia has meant that the interests of capital can only be 
protected at the expense of workers. The internal dynamic of the process of capital accumulation 
periodically creates obstacles to further accumulation and results in periods of slower growth and deeper 
recessions. Thus, in the two decades since the end of the postwar boom (1974-93), OECD GDP grew at 
half the rate experienced in the period 1960-74 (2.3% as against 4.9%), with unemployment more than 
doubling over the same period from 3.2 to 7.4 per cent (Bell, 1997: 89). This illustrates the way that, 
during periods of economic stagnation, capitalism is incapable of effectively reproducing its greatest 
asset, the working class (Grossmann 1970: 580-603; Grossmann 1971: 333; Kuhn: 1997). 
 
Several years of steady growth in the US economy in the mid 1990s helped to generate a sense of 
renewed optimism amongst capitalism’s intellectual supporters.1 But sluggish growth or continued 
recession in Europe, Japan and Australasia (leaving aside the situation in Africa and Latin America), 
followed by anxiety over “contagion” from the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, have generated fear 
amongst many OECD governments and international institutions about the underlying stability of their 
system. Underpinning this fear is an understanding that even after a decade of improvement in corporate 
profits,2 profit rates are nowhere close to those that sustained the long postwar boom (Kuhn and 
O’Lincoln 1989; Harman, 1993; Shaikh and Tonak, 1994). This explains the escalating fear that the new 
millennium may be characterised by a return to a deep recession if not depression in many major 
economies. 
 
The significance of this underlying tendency to stagnation and crisis is that the ‘fat’ in the system which 
could once have allowed social democratic governments to finance improvements to the welfare system 
and public infrastructure while also sustaining conditions for successful private sector capital 
accumulation, is no longer available. Massive public housing programmes, for example, are no longer on 
the agenda. On the one hand lower profit rates mean that business and governments cannot afford to 
spend as much on the reproduction of labour power. On the other hand the glut of labour associated with 
continuing high unemployment reduces pressure on them to do so. The outcome of these trends at the 
ideological level has been the triumph of the politics of supply-side economics and neo-liberalism. 
 
‘Globalisation’ 
 
The second factor which has affected the vitality of the traditional social democratic project has been the 
long-term tendency towards tighter integration of the world economy. Closer global economic integration 
has been a feature of the capitalist mode of production since its inception, but has been particularly 
consistent and intense since World War II. Most evidently since the early 1960s there has been a rapid 
expansion of international trade and finance, and with it greater international integration of production. 
This process has been well established in the literature and, although there is some debate about the 
actual extent of “globalisation”, the general direction is not in doubt (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).  
 
More controversial is the impact of economic internationalisation on the power of nation states and, by 
implication, the prospects for social democracy. One common argument is that capital is more detached 
from the nation state and more disconnected from a national identity than at any time in history (see 
Ohmae 1990 and 1996; Julius 1990; Dicken 1992; Horsman and Marshall 1994). The implication is that 
any notion that social democracy can capture the state and exercise significant leverage over key 
economic flows is bankrupt. Such conclusions are drawn not just by rightist business consultants (Ohmae 
1990; 1996), but also by social democrats such as Jessop (1990), Reich (1992), Catley (1996), and 
Martin and Schumann (1996), and Marxists, such as Harris (1991: 80-81). Harris, for example, argues 
that: 
 36 
 
 
The role of the state is being changed, from representing a national society and capital to the world (the 
old corporatist ‘social democratic’ alliance of state, business and labour in Britain), to enforcing on the 
domestic economy and society the imperatives of a global economy; from promoting the interests of 
domestic capital to seeking to capture and keep a share of global capital; from managing a relatively 
diversified and supposedly autonomous national economy to managing flows of goods and services 
which start and end far beyond the authority, or even the knowledge of the state ... It is this major 
material change which has destroyed the agenda of the left. 
 
This interpretation suggests that beggarly governments are now required to develop inviting domestic 
environments of low taxes, effective infrastructure, and well-educated but docile labour in the name of 
‘competitive advantage’, to enable maximum opportunities for profit making in order to attract footloose 
multinationals.3 These trends are strongly encouraged by the key agencies of international capitalism, the 
IMF and World Bank, which urge the dismantling of all remnants of previous nationalist policies of 
import substitution and state planning to permit unfettered access by Western banks and international 
credit flows (Stopford and Strange 1991). 
 
Also within a general Marxist framework, Harman (1991) has adopted a quite different and more 
convincing approach to the relationship between state and capital in an internationalised world. Harman 
identifies the state as a sometimes autonomous, but essential aspect of capital in general, with parallels to 
productive capital, money capital and commercial capital (Harman 1991: 16-20). The pressures of 
competition, including international competition, in the context of economic crisis have certainly 
undermined earlier patterns of state efforts to promote local capital accumulation. But they have given 
way to new patterns of active state intervention and organisation designed to encourage local investment 
and promote profitability within and across national boundaries (Marx 1977: 20-22). During the post 
World War II era, the effectiveness of direct state intervention, regulation and planning (which took its 
most extreme form in ‘communist’ countries) declined. Previously successful means to boost the 
competitiveness of local capital in market capitalist countries - protectionism in the form of tariffs and 
quotas, and direct regulation of capital movements and the financial sector - also became inefficient as 
policy tools. The failure of the Mitterand government’s attempt to expand social spending in the early 
1980s in the face of a devastating speculative attack on the French franc was testimony to this process. 
 
Contrary to the globalisation argument, however, such changes have not meant that states are no longer 
crucial factors in profit making, investment and growth, only that there has been a shift in the forms of 
state involvement. So, for example, direct state regulation of the assets of the banking sector in Australia 
to control interest rates and exchange rate pegging have both given way to open market operations 
through trading in currencies and government bonds. Similarly, while governments may no longer 
construct or even own public infrastructure projects or directly provide public services themselves, they 
shape private sector involvement in such activities through the letting of tenders, tax breaks, the 
establishment of performance criteria or the regulation of land-use and charges.4 Finally, it is states 
themselves that agree, or fail to agree, on conventions regarding flows of labour and capital at agencies of 
international capitalism such as the IMF. 
 
Thus it is not the case that globalisation (a process rather than an end point, and as much a feature of 
capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s as today) in itself sabotages the prospects for the traditional social 
democratic project by undermining the power of the nation state. There is nothing intrinsic to 
international economic integration that forces governments to degrade working class living standards in 
the interests of capital. Rather, it is globalisation in the context of underlying economic stagnation which 
forces governments to shift policy in this direction, using their still considerable capacities to boost the 
fortunes of their domestic capitals. Distinctive Australian circumstances have, of course, influenced the 
way in which the Australian state has sought to cope with the general tendencies of global integration and 
crisis. Two are of particular importance. One is the relative weakness of the Australia manufacturing 
sector and strength of the rural and mining industries. The other issue is Australia’s geographical and 
economic isolation. We will return to the significance of these factors below. 
 37 
 
 
 
The balance of class forces 
 
The final factor that helps explain the practice of social democratic governments since the 1970s has been 
the generally low levels of working class industrial and political mobilisation in northern Europe, North 
America and Australasia, at least until the mid-1990s, as indicated by low strike rates and declining union 
coverage (Visser 1989; Aligisakis 1997; ILO 1997). This situation derives from the process of capital 
accumulation at a fundamental level, but cannot simply be read off short or even medium term 
fluctuations in economic activity. Other things being equal, a combative and militant working class is 
likely to force social democratic governments into concessions which they would not otherwise have 
made. In the absence of such pressure, social democratic governments have been able to implement 
austerity policies which a more self-confident working class would have resisted. While the mid-1990s 
witnessed an upsurge of large union demonstrations and mass strikes in several European countries this 
has not yet been sufficient to make much impact on social democratic parties: such actions have usually 
been limited to the public sector (placing somewhat less pressure on the capitalist class than if they 
included private sector workers), not usually sustained over more than one or two months, and have not 
yet generated strong grassroots networks or working-class militants. 
 
In summary, the rightward shift in social democratic practice evident since the late 1970s has been a 
consequence of long-term economic stagnation, which recent American economic growth has not 
overcome; the intensification of pressure on national governments to implement policies allowing sectors 
of local capital to integrate more effectively into international circuits of capital accumulation in a 
context of economic austerity; and limited counter-pressure from their working class constituencies. We 
now turn to Australia to see how these factors played themselves out in the course of what was one of 
this century’s longest and, in purely electoral terms, most successful social democratic governments. 
 
PERESTROIKA DOWN UNDER 
 
Background 
 
Before considering the Labor Government’s approach to economic management, it is important to 
understand some basic features of the Australian economy and the ALP as they stood in 1983. While the 
Australian continent is huge — 7.7 million square kilometres — the population is small but growing 
quickly (15.4 million in 1983: 18.0 million in 1996) and concentrated on the south east seaboard and in 
the State capital cities. Australia has an advanced industrialised economy. In 1983 Australia’s Gross 
National Product per capita per annum was in the middle of the developed economies’ range, roughly 
comparable with Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark and Austria. Over 80 per cent of the labour force 
were wage and salary earners in 1983, and 37 per cent of the labour force were women. 
 
The largest sector of Australian industry in 1983 was (and is) services with 73 per cent of output in 1983, 
followed by the manufacturing (18%), mining (6%) and rural (3%) sectors.5 In terms of trade, however, 
Australia was reliant on primary commodity exports whose share of world merchandise trade was shortly 
to decline sharply (Bell, 1997: 83). While elaborately transformed manufactures contributed only around 
12 per cent of exports during the early 1980s, they dominated imports to Australia. The country has 
traditionally relied on foreign investment to cover a current account deficit, which stood at $6.8 billion or 
four per cent of GDP (dollar amounts are Australian dollars unless otherwise indicated) in 1982-83, while 
Australia’s foreign debt amounted to 14 per cent of GDP. 
 
Although Australia’s exposure to international trade is low for a small economy (the ratio of exports to 
GDP was only 15 per cent in 1982-83), its reliance on capital inflows, primary product exports and lack 
of close integration into a regional market such as the European Union or North American Free Trade 
Area has made it very susceptible to international fluctuations (Dyster and Meredith, 1990). In part as a 
consequence, the recessions of the period since the early 1970s have tended to be deeper in Australia, and 
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the recoveries of the 1980s and 1990s somewhat stronger than those experienced in most other OECD 
countries. 
 
Politically, Australia is distinguished by its very long tradition of social democracy. Indeed, the 
Australian Labor Party traces its origins back to the early 1890s and Labor first took office at State level 
in Queensland as early as 1899, making it the world’s first ever social democratic government. As is the 
case with all such parties, the policies of the ALP can be traced back to its relationships with the working 
class and the capitalist class. In terms of the former, trade unions are affiliated to the ALP and provide it 
with considerable resources, both financial and human. Trade union leaders also play prominent roles in 
the internal affairs of the Party. They are delegates to State Conferences, power-brokers and officers of 
the Party, at the local branch, Electorate Council, State Executive and National Executive levels. The 
proportion of ex-union officials in Labor Parliamentary Caucuses may have declined during the postwar 
period, but union office is still one of the most common routes to a parliamentary seat in the ALP. The 
interaction between party and union is two-way, as involvement in the Party can also assist in an 
individual’s elevation to union office. 
 
The dominance of union leaders within the ALP has had a particular effect on the character of the party. 
Such leaders may once have been part of the rank and file of the union movement (although this is less 
the case than formerly (Bramble, 1995a)), but as union officials they are professional negotiators. They 
therefore represent a social layer that is based on the industrial power of the working class but which is 
not in itself of that class: it is a unique intermediary layer between labour and capital. Engaged in the 
business of wholesaling labour power, accommodation and compromise are the union leader’s natural 
predisposition. When capitalism enters a period of stagnation, such compromises will increasingly 
involve sacrifices by workers. Various material benefits in the form of salaries and better working 
conditions then merely cement in place a predilection for reform over revolution. The structural position 
of trade union officials within capitalism sets strict limits to the activities of even the most militant of 
them. This is not a feature unique to the past decade but has been commented upon from the earliest days 
by observers of Labor parliamentarians and trade union officials (Winspear 1915; Childe 1964 (orig. 
1923)). Within these limits, however, their intermediary position means that when the rank and file is 
self-confident and active, they can transmit pressure from below onto the Labor Party. 
 
Through the trade unions and the Party, Labor governments therefore have a distinctive and closer 
relationship with the working class than the conservative parties. Despite declines in the proportion of 
working class members of the Party’s branches, workers constitute a much larger proportion of its 
membership than of its conservative opponents (Scott 1991). This is even more true of Labor’s electoral 
base: even at the 1996 election which ended Labor’s long period in government, the ALP’s electoral lead 
amongst trade unionists was 23 per cent, and among blue collar voters at large, 8 per cent (Bean and 
McAllister 1997). In the working class heartlands of Sydney and Melbourne, Labor still won 70 per cent 
of the two-party preferred vote (Bean and McAllister 1997).  
 
Alongside pressure from the union movement, the ALP, especially when in Government, is also subject 
to intense pressure from business. Given its determination to work through the machinery of state, the 
ALP must respond to the fact that this is essentially a capitalist institution that works in close co-
ordination and according to the basic needs of Australian business (Lindblom, 1977; Bell, 1992). 
Throughout its history, therefore, willingly or unwillingly, Labor has been prepared to accept 
responsibility for managing Australian capitalism for fear of the alternative – subdued business 
expectations and therefore lower investment and a collapse in the currency, in other words a “capital 
strike”, or other forms of economic or political sabotage by the business sector.6 Labor therefore responds 
to the needs of capital but at the same time retains its distinctiveness from mainstream conservative 
parties by virtue of its organic ties to the working class. It is this partial independence from the capitalist 
class, both financially and in terms of its voting base, that means that it can at times better serve the long-
term interests of Australian capitalism. Unlike the conservative Coalition parties which are tied up both 
personally and financially with sectoral business interests, Labor enjoys a relative freedom to enact 
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legislation or introduce policies that hurt the interests of specific sections of capital but benefit the class 
as a whole (Sharkey 1943, Kuhn 1989).7 
 
During the 1960s, for example, the rural sector and the increasingly important minerals sector of 
Australian business had been trying to move the Australian business class as a whole away from its 
hitherto dominant strategy of relying upon high tariffs and import replacement in the manufacturing 
sector. However, they had been stymied by the political lobbying power of large manufacturers geared to 
domestic markets. It was not until the election of a Labor Government in 1972 that radical action was 
taken to achieve this shift and tariffs were slashed across the board by 25 per cent. This process then 
stalled in several highly protected sectors for a further seven years after Labor lost power in 1975. 
Similarly, the conservative Coalition Government of 1975-83 shrank from implementing its own 
inquiry’s recommendations for modernising the financial system involving mergers and takeovers in the 
banking sector for fear of antagonising key individual members of its political support base. It was left to 
the incoming Hawke Labor Government to rationalise and open up the banking sector soon after taking 
office. 
 
Enter the Accord 
 
The Hawke and Keating Labor governments of 1983-96 differed from the Whitlam ALP government of 
1972-75 in several key respects. While the Whitlam Government enjoyed only very ad hoc and fragile 
understandings with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) concerning economic, industrial 
relations and wages policies, which created tense relationships between the two wings of the labour 
movement (Singleton, 1990), Hawke was elected in 1983 with a clear commitment from the country’s 
union movement to industrial discipline and wage restraint. The Prices and Incomes Accord had been 
signed by the ACTU and the Labor Opposition in February 1982 even before Labor won power. In this 
Accord (which subsequently went through a further seven versions in the course of 13 years), the ACTU 
and incoming Government agreed to wage restraint in return for the promise of improvements in 
employment, the social wage and, ‘over  time’, real wages.8 
 
The Accord was a politically saleable package both to workers and to business. The Labor Party’s 
commitments in the Accord, to create jobs, raise social expenditure and maintain wages in collaboration 
with the union movement, seemed plausible and attractive to Australian workers after the conservative 
Fraser Government’s attacks on unions and working class living standards and in the context of 
unemployment above 10 per cent. A key role in winning acceptance of the Accord within the labour 
movement was played by leaders of the left-wing building and metalworkers unions, whose members  
had the industrial capacity to render the agreement ineffective. Current and former members of the 
Communist Party (by this time social-democratic in its orientation), some holding leadership positions in 
key left unions, played a particularly important role in this process.  
 
The intellectual basis for their arguments leant heavily on the work of a series of social democratic 
academics and union researchers, such as Hughes (1981), Hartnett (1981), Higgins (1978, 1980, 1985), 
Stilwell (1982), Burford (1983), Ogden (1984), Mathews (1986), and Clegg et al (1986). Frequently 
drawing on the German and Scandinavian experiences, these writers commonly used neo-corporatist or 
‘power resource’ approaches which were popular at this time to justify the politics of the Accord.9 They 
suggested that the Accord would enable the union movement to break out of its traditional “economistic” 
straitjacket to encompass broader political concerns and to develop a social role well beyond the ranks of 
organised labour. Supporters pointed to a commitment in the Accord that ‘consultative mechanisms of a 
widespread nature … will play a coordinated and ongoing role in assisting the success of the transition of 
the economy onto a planned framework’. This was counterposed favourably to ‘ultra-militancy’ or short-
term syndicalism, by which was meant attempts by workers to improve their living standards by means of 
industrial action.  
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Business was equally attracted to Hawke’s message of social consensus. Influential business interests had 
hoped that his conservative predecessor would confront and destroy the power of trade unionism 
(O’Lincoln, 1993). Fraser had clearly failed. Nor, from their point of view, had he taken sufficient steps 
to promote the international outlook of Australian capital, especially in what was becoming a booming 
Asian economic zone on Australia’s doorstep. Consequently, some sections of business had begun to 
view the Fraser’s period in office as being ‘wasted years’10 and looked to Labor as being more capable of 
pursuing both the suppression of union activism and more aggressive engagement in international circuits 
of trade and finance. Thus by the time of the 1983 elections, the conservative Melbourne Herald, a long-
time supporter of the Coalition parties, made a break with its past and called for a Labor vote. Business 
sentiment was also evident in the decision by Fraser’s own Minister for Industrial Relations to endorse 
the Accord approach shortly before the March 1983 election (O’Lincoln 1993: 231).  
 
The Practice of the Accord 
 
Wages, Productivity and Union Strength 
 
While more than an incomes policy, one of the Accord’s key achievements in the eyes of business was 
that it significantly reduced real wages. Although this occurred in other OECD nations in the 1980s and 
1990s, the means involved in Australia were quite distinctive. Australia has had a highly legalistic 
industrial relations system since the first decade of the 20th Century. In their jurisdictions, the quasi-
judicial Industrial Relations Commission and its State counterparts could make legally binding decisions 
to resolve industrial disputes in the form of ‘awards’, which cover wages and a wide range of conditions 
of employment. Initially, the Accord radically centralised this system. The various versions of the Accord 
between the ACTU and Government were (until Mark VI in 1991) essentially ratified by the Commission 
and precluded unions from pursuing any ‘further claims’. Initially wages were fully indexed across the 
board to the rate of inflation. But, in 1985, full indexation gave way to partial indexation, and that in turn 
to a combination of meagre flat rate pay increases and percentage rises. 
 
Contrary to the Accord’s initial promise, therefore, real wages were not maintained ‘over time’. While 
the actual reduction of real wages through the 1980s and the specific impact of the Accord are both 
subject to debate, all Australian commentators accept that real wages fell in the 1980s by anything 
between two and ten per cent, while estimates of the specific impact of the Accord vary between five and 
nine per cent (Chapman et al 1991). Measured purely in terms of full-time award wages, which cover 
only the non-managerial workforce, workers’ wages fell by 12.8 per cent in real terms between 1983 and 
1990 and by a further 3.2 per cent before Labor lost power in 1996. While managerial salaries increased 
by 125 per cent in nominal terms between 1985 and 1995, nominal average weekly earnings only rose by 
70 per cent (Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC), 1996: 99).  
 
The suppression of wages and expansion of rewards for the rich was one reason for continued employer 
support for the ALP Government throughout the 1980s. Another was Labor’s enthusiasm for what 
became known variously as workplace reform, benchmarking or international best practice (Keating 
1990a:8; Keating 1990b:14). Centralised wage fixing, based on partial cost of living adjustments, was 
replaced in 1988 by a requirement that wage increases could only be achieved in return for productivity 
trade-offs. Initially, this process of ‘structural efficiency’ involved streamlining and reducing the number 
of award classifications (job categories for the purposes of pay and conditions), facilitating the removal 
of ‘restrictive work practices’ (such as standard working hours, seniority, demarcations between duties of 
different categories of workers, and established staffing ratios), and achieving savings through the 
intensification of labour (Bramble 1989).  
 
The tendency for wage increases to become less based on workers’ needs and more on employer capacity 
to pay was taken a step further in 1991 with the advent of enterprise (company-level) bargaining. Such a 
step had been advocated by the peak employer body, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) since 
1987, but had initially been resisted by both the Government and the ACTU. Four years later both the 
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Government and the peak union council not only consented to enterprise bargaining but actively fought 
for its introduction in the teeth of opposition from the Industrial Relations Commission, which favoured 
maintaining the primacy of the award system. The outcome of enterprise bargaining for workers in 
subsequent years was almost uniformly negative, involving as it did longer working hours, increased use 
of shift work, reduced penalty rates for work in unsocial hours and more casual and part time 
employment (Bramble, 1995b; Department of Industrial Relations 1995). The overall result of Labor’s 
wages policies, both in their centralised phase during the 1980s and in their decentralised phase in the 
following decade, was an increase in the profit share of national income from 38 to 44 per cent. 
 
The ACTU, far from resisting these attacks on the award system and working conditions, supported them 
- first because it too was committed to a more competitive Australian capitalism even if that required 
sacrifices by its own members, and second because it hoped to preempt an even more radical version of 
labour market deregulation of the type being introduced across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand (Kelsey, 
1995). Continued ACTU co-operation in Labor’s wage-cutting agenda was facilitated by the general lack 
of organised opposition at the grassroots of the labour movement. The collapse of strike activity in 1982, 
even before Labor took office, had made the Accord option of centralised control over wages acceptable 
amongst many union militants. However, once the world recovery took effect in the mid-1980s and 
unemployment started to fall, rank and file activity still did not recover, despite falling real wages. In 
part, this was due to the Accord mechanism itself, which in the period 1983-87 was premised on money 
wage increases (however small) arriving without any action by workers. But it was also a consequence of 
the ACTU acting quickly against any union or section of a union which threatened to break Accord 
commitments. The weakness of the radical left was a further factor. Radical political ideas (let alone a 
leadership) which could explain why the political basis on which the Accord was sold to workers was 
inherently flawed had little influence in the Australian labour movement.  
 
Nonetheless, acquiescence in the framework of the Accord did not necessarily entail enthusiastic 
acceptance of ACTU and Labor Government policies on the part of rank and file workers. Indeed, the 
ACTU’s endorsement of years of wage cutting through the mid-1980s, followed by its promotion of 
work intensification and labour shedding under enterprise bargaining, led to immense disillusionment 
within the union movement. However, this did not lead to an industrial backlash by unions since muscles 
not used began to atrophy. Workplace union organisation began to wither in some core industries. 
Membership coverage, which had been remarkably steady at between 45 and 55 per cent of the 
workforce over the entire postwar period, began a continuous decline, falling from 49.5 per cent in 1982 
to 40.5 per cent in 1990, and thence to 35 per cent by the time that Labor lost office in 1996, the lowest 
level since the 1910s (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Trade Union Statistics; Trade Union 
Members).  
 
Industry Restructuring 
 
While business was happy to see labour costs and union strength wound back, Labor was also successful 
in promoting large scale industry rationalisation in both the private and public sectors through its industry 
and related policies.11 Since the late 1960s an increasing proportion of the economics profession, public 
service economists and politicians from both the conservative and Labor parties were persuaded that the 
traditional strategy for developing Australian industry, by securing the domestic market for local 
producers mainly through tariff protection, was no longer satisfactory. The scale of industry had grown 
so large that the attempt to create a comprehensive manufacturing sector within the borders of a country 
with a population of 13-16 million was becoming prohibitively costly and an enormous drain on 
internationally competitive sectors of the economy. Consequently, influential sections of business were 
by the early 1980s stridently demanding a ‘rationalisation’ of protected industries, on the lines of the 
OECD’s structural adjustment programme (OECD, 1989), involving reductions in tariffs, upgrading of 
average plant size so as to attain economies of scale, and technological renewal. 
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Labor responded to these calls even more decisively than it had under Whitlam in 1973. Where its 
conservative predecessor had been strong on free trade rhetoric but weak on action, the Labor 
Government of 1983-96 delivered dramatic cuts in tariffs and import quotas. Effective rates of assistance 
to manufacturing, which had fluctuated between 23 and 27 per cent under the Fraser Government, were 
brought down to only 10 per cent by 1993-94 (Fahrer and Pease 1994: 186).12 By the time that Labor lost 
power in 1996, Australia had tariff levels below those of many of its main trading partners. 
 
Labor’s approach was not, however, simply to combine wage reductions with market liberalisation which 
might simply have jeopardised capital investment. The Government sought to improve profitability and 
competitiveness with a variety of additional tools. In the context of a series of tripartite consultative 
industry plans, the Government used tariff reductions together with subsidies for investment and the 
retraining of redundant workers, as well as industry-specific measures, to improve the international 
competitiveness of core Australian industries13 such as the textile clothing and footwear, iron and steel, 
and car industries. There were similar less formal arrangements in other industries, such as stevedoring, 
ship and aircraft construction, pharmaceuticals, computers, telecommunications and heavy engineering. 
These packages led to substantial increases in exports, labour productivity and job losses. Other 
measures, such as the 150 per cent tax deduction for research and development expenditure, were 
designed to elicit new state-of-the-art investment. Rationalisation was applied even more rigorously to 
the public sector. In 1993, contracting-out and compulsory competitive tendering became Government 
policy, with the adoption of a National Competition Policy, effectively written by Australia’s leading 
professor of management (and former partner of McKinseys consultancy), Professor Fred Hilmer. 
 
Just as was the case with its wages policies, the Labor Government ensured that it had the support of its 
Accord partners in these industry programmes. While Australian unions had long been ardent defenders 
of import substitution in manufacturing industry, union policy during the 1980s underwent a 
transformation. As former Treasurer John Dawkins put it on his retirement in 1994, ‘After the 1983 
election, the ACTU was converted to the central elements of a pro-business agenda and through its 
enhanced central power, was able to engage the entire union movement in its support’ (Australian 
Financial Review, 15 July 1994). In steel, motor vehicles, metal trades and shipbuilding, unions were key 
players in restructuring committees at industry and enterprise level, much as they had been promised by 
the Accord commitments. The ACTU’s seminal report Australia Reconstructed (1987) codified 
acceptance of the changed conception of industry policy within the union movement, restating the 
ACTU’s commitment to improving the efficiency and international competitiveness of Australian 
industry as a means to achieve economic growth and full employment.  
 
The problem for the unions was that the only route by which many Australian industries could be 
competitive on world markets was by large scale labour-shedding. The result was that in many cases 
union activists from national leaders to job delegates effectively became the front line of employer efforts 
to convince workers that redundancies and major changes to work practices were inevitable (Bramble, 
1993). The outcome of restructuring was a significant increase in productivity and reduction in 
employment in the affected industries: manufacturing employment fell by more than 23 per cent between 
1981-82 and 1992-93, while productivity rose by over 44 per cent (Fahrer and Pease 1994: 200). In the 
public sector, employment in government enterprises in Australia fell by 24 per cent between 1987-88 
and 1992-93 while labour productivity rose by over one hundred per cent. (Steering Committee on 
National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, 1994).  
 
Reform of the capital market began early on in Labor’s period in office with the floating of the Australian 
dollar, a reduction in government control over bank activities, and the admission of foreign banks to 
Australia. The Government also relaxed rules on the ownership of print and electronic media (facilitating 
the expansion of Rupert Murdoch’s empire and his domination of the Australian daily press) and 
terminated the statutory duopoly in the domestic airline industry. The state monopoly on 
telecommunications was also ended. This was followed by a proposal to privatise Australian Telecom 
(now Telstra). After Paul Keating ousted Bob Hawke as Prime Minister, in December 1991, the 
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Government went further, privatising the Commonwealth Bank and the state owned airlines and, in 
cooperation with State governments, significantly cutting the national rail transport network. In all cases, 
there were large numbers of redundancies and, in many, asset stripping of the new entities by their 
private sector owners. The hopes harboured by Australian capitalists in 1983 that Labor would be able to 
succeed in restructuring the economy where Fraser had failed proved justified. 
 
Other policies 
 
Given the increasing acceptance of its underlying economic programme within the leadership of the 
union movement, the Labor government felt free to shape other social and economic policies to the needs 
of competitive accumulation. In the area of education, for example, the Government recognised the need 
to increase the skill level of the Australian workforce and to this end increased the number of students in 
tertiary education by 44 per cent between 1987 and 1995. Given its pro-business agenda, it sought to pay 
for this expansion not through increased taxes on the ultimate ‘end users’ of this new ‘resource’, 
business, but by demanding payment from the students themselves in the form of a “graduate tax” to be 
paid on taking up full-time work.  
 
The taxation system was similarly reshaped to more effectively meet business demands. Tax reforms and 
the wider application of user-pays principles for public services shifted the burden of government 
imposts. Personal income taxation was made less progressive, company taxation reduced, and the 
significance of indirect taxation increased. In each case capital benefited at the expense of the working 
class. Compulsory superannuation was introduced in order to reduce future public outlays on means-
tested pensions and to increase the pool of savings available for investment. Other welfare provisions 
were rejigged to restrict eligibility and to pressure recipients to participate in or return to the paid 
workforce. Unemployment benefit was abolished for those under 18, and ‘hit squads’ of fraud inspectors 
were established by the Department of Social Security to harrass those on long-term benefits. 
 
Although multiculturalism was bipartisan government policy from the 1970s until the mid-1990s, this did 
not prevent the Labor Government undermining its policy commitment to social equity for immigrants 
and the country’s indigenous people where such a commitment threatened to cost the Government money 
or where it called into question the priorities of capital. Thus, the immigration intake was both cut back 
sharply in the early 1990s and switched away from family reunions towards immigrants with wealth, 
businesses or special skills. New migrants were also debarred from claiming social security for six 
months after their arrival. One example of Labor’s penny-pinching approach to migration concerns was 
its scandalous record on refugees. When 500 Indochinese refugees fleeing political persecution, 
suppression of civil rights or dire economic hardship arrived on the northern shores of Australia in 
makeshift boats in early 1995, dozens were promptly incarcerated in “detention camps”, in some cases 
for up to five years, while their applications for refugee status were processed. Legal aid was denied 
those whose cases were taken to court (Bramble, 1996b).  
 
The Government’s attitude towards the indigenous population was also at odds with its initial 
commitments to national land rights policy contained in its 1983 election manifesto. Australia’s 
Aboriginal population, comprising less than two percent of the total, is the poorest and unhealthiest group 
in the country, with the lowest life expectancy. Aborigines are also strong Labor supporters (Bennett, 
1996: 159). However, when faced by opposition from the mining industry and State governments, 
especially the Western Australian Labor administration, the Federal Government abandoned its planned 
extension of Aboriginal land rights. Similarly, the bulk of recommendations of a 1988 report on the large 
number of black deaths in police custody and prisons was ignored by the Commonwealth and State 
governments. And finally, when confronted in the early 1990s with a High Court judgement (the ‘Mabo 
decision’) on land rights which was favourable to the Aboriginal population, the Keating Government set 
out to undermine the full benefit of this decision through its 1993 Native Title Act. Not a single land 
claim had been successfully pursued by Aboriginal groups, under the new Act, by the time Labor had lost 
office three years later. 
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DID LABOR DELIVER? 
 
For Business? 
 
Labor’s period in office achieved four major positive outcomes for capital. First, as we have seen, an 
increase in the profits share of national income, particularly during the 1980s (EPAC, 1996: 18). Second, 
a steady but gradual reduction in public spending as a percentage of GDP, from 30 per cent in 1984 to 27 
per cent ten years later. Partly as a result, the Australian Government ran a budget surplus for four 
successive years in the latter half of the decade. This enabled the Government to cut the corporate tax rate 
from 48 per cent to 36 per cent.  
 
The third benefit for business was a change in the pattern of trade and tighter integration with the world 
economy, with both inward and outward foreign investment growing strongly. Exports grew from 15 per 
cent of GDP in 1982-83 to 20 per cent by 1995-96, while the figure for imports grew from 17 to 20 per 
cent. Just as importantly, there were significant changes in the composition of exports. While agricultural 
exports increased by 170 per cent in current dollar terms between 1982-83 and 1995-96, the rise in 
mining exports was 230 per cent and manufacturing, from a very low base, grew 610 per cent over the 
same period. The value of elaborately transformed manufacturing exports tripled in real terms(ABS 
Monthly Summary of Statistics; Sheehan, Pappas and Ching 1994) and underpinned the rapid overall 
growth in manufacturing exports. Labor therefore presided over a shift in Australia’s exports to a pattern 
closer to those of other developed countries. As for investment, Australian business became a significant 
player as a foreign investor (outside its traditional South West Pacific base) for the first time in its 
history, with the stock of overseas investment overseas rising from just over $20 billion in 1982-83 to 
more than $140 billion by 1995-96. International integration had its costs, however, and external net debt 
blew out substantially from only $23 billion in 1982-83 (about 7 per cent of GDP) to $188 billion in 
1995-96 (about 40 per cent), and the servicing costs of overseas loans led to a severe deterioration in the 
current account deficit, which rose from $6.8 billion in 1982-83 to $20.3 billion in 1995-96 (as a 
proportion of GDP it fluctuated between three and six per cent, significantly higher than in the largest 
OECD economies). Ballooning deficits were an important factor behind the sharp decline of 29 per cent 
in the value of the Australian dollar, compared to the currencies of its major trading partners, between 
1984 and 1986.  
 
Finally, and unlike the experience under the the conservative Fraser Government, when, in 1980-81 a 
strike wave broke efforts to cut real wages through partial indexation, the Hawke and Keating Labor 
Governments were able to engineer a major shift of national income from wages to profits without an 
industrial rebellion in the ranks of the unions. Industrial action fell to unprecedently low levels and 
stayed low even during the period of strong employment growth in the middle to latter parts of the 1980s, 
thanks to strong discipline exerted by the ACTU. By the time that the Government left office, Australian 
business had enjoyed more than a decade of industrial peace (ABS Industrial Disputes).  
 
For Workers? 
 
Labor and the ACTU attributed a series of benefits to the Accord for workers. These included rapid 
employment growth, lower unemployment, rises in average household income and the social wage, and 
income redistribution to women and the poor (see, for example, Keating and Willis 1985). It is worth 
examining some of these alleged benefits in a little more detail. 
 
(i) Employment and Unemployment 
 
During the economic upturn of 1984 to 1990, employment in Australia grew by 3.4 per cent per annum, 
double the OECD average.14 While real wage cuts under the Accord probably made some, relatively 
small, contribution to employment and growth after 1983 (Chapman, 1996), wages were not their only 
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determinant. The international experience of recovery between 1983 and 1989 suggests that the bulk of 
the improvements in employment and growth were attributable to cyclical factors largely beyond 
government control. This conclusion is confirmed by the dramatic rise in unemployment during the 
recession of the early 1990s which occurred in all Western economies regardless of prior changes in 
wages (and in Australia despite several years of wage cuts). In this period redundancies grew from an 
annual rate of 350,000 to 650,000, while unemployment increased by more than 80 per cent to a rate of 
11 per cent of the workforce (ABS The Labour Force). During the subsequent 1993-96 recovery, 
unemployment stabilised at a level over eight percent, significantly above the rate of the mid to late 
1980s and massively above the 1.3 per cent that Australian workers had enjoyed in the postwar boom 
years of 1953-74 (Bell, 1997: 88). Furthermore, there has been a secular increase in the importance of 
long term unemployment, which accounted for 32 per cent of the unemployed in 1995, up from only 4.5 
per cent 20 years earlier (EPAC, 1996: x). 
 
Within these broad and fluctuating aggregates, several other features of the labour market under Labor 
merit attention. First, there was a sharp growth of the female participation rate (from 45 to 53 per cent 
between 1983 and 1995) and a decline in the male rate (79 to 75 per cent) (EPAC, 1996: 42). By 1997, 
women accounted for 43 per cent of the workforce. Other labour market changes during the period were 
less favourable for workers. First there was strong growth in insecure part-time and casual employment, 
associated with the rise in the female participation rate, to the extent that Australia now has the second 
highest rate of part-time employment in the OECD (25 per cent), after Holland. There was, secondly, 
strong growth in low-paid employment (those earning less than 75 per cent of the median wage) and 
some growth at the top (defined as those with more than 175 per cent of the median wage), with a 
‘shrinking middle’ at the core of the jobs market (those earning between 75 and 175 per cent of the 
median) (Hunter and Rimmer, 1995).  
 
Thirdly, the number of jobs in the manufacturing and public sectors, with their stronger traditions of 
unionism, continued to fall, while there was growth in the personal services sector and small business 
sectors (EPAC, 1996: 32). Fourth, the labour market became increasingly polarised. On the one hand, 
those in full-time work were increasingly exhausted by unpaid overtime (their hours worked grew from 
40 per week in 1978 to 44 per week in 1995, while the proportion working more than 49 hours per week 
increased from 28 to 37 per cent between 1987 and 1996) (EPAC, 1996: 48). On the other hand, there 
were the work-hungry, employed part-time but looking for more hours. The fifth significant feature of 
the labour market was a shift in employer strategy in some key areas towards contracting out 
(‘outsourcing’) and a relative decline in direct employment. This approach sought to undermine union 
bargaining power and working conditions by displacing costs of employment onto marginal 
subcontracting businesses. 
 
The Labor Government did not necessarily directly cause these features of the labour market to develop. 
However, it certainly endorsed some and took action that had the effect of increasing others. For 
example, the broad economic programme of putting business needs first meant that Labor conducted its 
macroeconomic policy in 1989-90 in a way such as to bring about what the then Treasurer called ‘the 
recession that we had to have’, in the knowledge that unemployment would climb sharply. Labor’s 
extensive privatisation programme and contracting-out within surviving public enterprises severely 
reduced job security for hundreds of thousands of workers. Labor also promoted enterprise bargaining, 
which involved trading-off important conditions for marginal wage increases. The abolition of penalty 
rates in a number of industries, for example, facilitated the extension of working hours. In summary, 
therefore, the claims made that sacrifices in real wages under the Accord led to significant improvements 
in the employment opportunities of Australian workers do not bear close scrutiny. 
 
(ii) Social Wage and Taxation 
 
Faced by the decline in real wages during the 1980s, proponents of the Accord argued that wage cuts 
were at least partially offset by improvements in the social wage - health, education and welfare spending 
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- which accrued to all members of the working class, whether in the labour force or not (Evatt 
Foundation, 1995: 34 & 170). However, while the real level of welfare benefits increased under Labor, 
the welfare system was made more selective, thereby actually reducing access to welfare for some 
working-class families. Furthermore, ‘user pays’ for formerly free Government services, the graduate tax 
on higher education, fiscal drag (despite income tax cuts), and a shift towards indirect taxation meant that 
large numbers of those in work and with moderate incomes had to pay for improvements to the social 
wage through higher taxes. Tax rates for people with an income of between 50 and 75 per cent of average 
weekly earnings declined between 1983 and 1988 but increased for those on average weekly earnings. 
Those on double and quadruple average weekly earnings enjoyed cuts to their tax payments. 
 
The targeting of benefits, increased taxes for many working-class households and the sharp decline in 
real award wages meant that working-class household disposable incomes fell across the board between 
1984 and 1994, by nine per cent for the bottom quintile, by seven per cent for the second, by nearly five 
per cent for the third and just under one per cent for the fourth. This occurred despite a growing number 
of families in which both adults were in jobs. Only the top quintile of households enjoyed an increase in 
real disposable income in this decade, of 2.5 per cent (ABS Australian Social Trends 1997). Given that 
the stock exchange rose steadily, by 150 per cent before 1990 and a further 48 per cent by 1996, 
generating healthy returns to those living off dividends, the overall effect of these trends was growing 
inequality, with the proportion of real disposable income accruing to the poorest quintile of households 
falling from 6.3 to 5.8 per cent, the share going to the top quintile rising from 38.8 to 40.4 per cent15 
(ABS Australian Social Trends 1997). 
 
(iii) The situation for women and migrants 
 
A common argument made in the early years of the Accord was that by holding back on large wage 
claims, the powerful (usually male-dominated) unions could create the potential for those workers on low 
wages and with weak bargaining power (often women or migrants) to enjoy the benefits of the 
anticipated employment recovery. Quite what the mechanism was to be connecting these two phenomena 
was never really explained. What, then, was the actual situation for women and migrants under the 
Accord?  
 
Dealing first with the issue of gender equity, wage differentials were compressed for a period but not 
significantly. In the heyday of centralised wage fixing between 1983 and 1988, female full-time average 
weekly ordinary-time earnings increased as a proportion of male earnings from 80.6 to 83.2 per cent. 
However, from this point on, no further progress was made by the time that Labor lost office eight years 
later (Fieldes 1997: 114 and 117). Furthermore, the differential only narrowed by this amount in a period 
when real wages for all workers, both male and female, declined. Most women were also hit by the 
polarisation of the jobs market already described. Between 1980-84 and 1993, the proportion of all 
women in low-paid jobs increased from 28.5 to 32.9 per cent and those in middle income jobs fell by 11 
per cent from 66.5 to 55.5 per cent. However, one group of women prospered under Labor, those in 
professional and managerial positions. Women earning more than 175 per cent of the median wage 
increased their representation in the female labour force from 5.0 to 11.7 per cent (Hunter and Rimmer 
1995). Such women benefited from the Labor Government’s introduction of equal opportunity and anti-
discrimination legislation. 
 
Although anti-discrimination legislation was a gain for all women at work, its effect on women in 
working-class jobs was overwhelmed by the wage-cutting logic of the Accord. Indeed, the very 
commitment to centralised wage discipline undermined the ability of unions to press for wage equity for 
women. This became clear in the mid-1980s when the ACTU pursued a ‘comparable worth’ case for 
nurses through the Industrial Relations (then Arbitration) Commission. This was designed to overcome 
long-standing inconsistencies between nurses’ low pay and the wages of skilled, mainly male, 
tradespeople. The Commission rejected the nurses’ case, arguing that any significant wage settlement 
would jeopardise its overarching commitment to wage stability. When nurses took action to force the 
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issue in an unprecedented 50-day strike in late 1986, they were left to fight alone by the ACTU (Ross 
1987). Women’s situation did not improve with the end of centralised wage control, because their 
disproportionate representation in low paid, casual, part-time and poorly unionised segments of the 
labour force has undermined their ability to make gains in productivity bargaining and award 
restructuring (Bennett, 1994). Finally, the restructuring of the female-dominated textiles, clothing and 
footwear industries under the impact of industry rationalisation adversely affected the position of tens of 
thousands of women workers. The same was true for the tens of thousands of migrants from non-English 
speaking backgrounds who were hit hard by restructuring of the vehicle and iron and steel industries. 
Many such workers had little chance of finding other work in the depressed job market of the 1990s. 
 
THE ACCORD UNRAVELS 
 
We have seen that the economic outcomes of the Labor Government of 1983-96 disproportionately 
favoured business. In this respect, Australian economic policy under Labor was little different to that of 
most other OECD governments. The distinctiveness of the Labor Government’s approach lay in its 
extension of ‘corporatist’ arrangements both during the recession of the early 1980s and in subsequent 
restructuring strategy. Australia was not, of course, a pioneer in this regard. Other such experiments have 
included the British ‘Social Contract’ between 1974 and 1978, while corporatist arrangements in Sweden 
facilitated significant industry restructuring until the 1970s. However, in all cases, such corporatist 
models have fallen apart as one or several of the major ‘social partners’ withdraws from the arrangement. 
British public sector workers, provoked by successive austerity budgets and falling real wages, launched 
a wave of strikes during the 1978-79 ‘Winter of Discontent’, culminating in the defeat of the Labour 
Government (Panitch 1980; Cliff and Gluckstein 1988). In Sweden, by contrast, it was the employers 
who pulled out. Economic crisis, coupled with Sweden’s half-in, half-out relationship with the European 
Community, made the extent of the welfare state, low unemployment and high rates of taxation obstacles 
to competitive capital accumulation required by increasingly internationally focused blocks of Swedish 
capital (Löfgren 1988; Wilks 1996)). As these structures were challenged, ‘orderly’ wage setting tended 
to come apart during the 1980s and early 1990s, and in 1991 the Social Democrats lost office. The re-
election of the Swedish social democrats in 1994 has seen them pursue an orthodox neo-liberal approach 
to economic management. 
 
In the case of Australia, the Accord finally collapsed when Labor lost the March 1996 election following 
the desertion of the ALP by many previously supportive employers and subsequently by important 
sections of the Party’s working-class base. Recognition of Labor’s pro-business economic agenda had 
initially led to strong backing from business. Confrontationist  tactics, both industrial and political, were 
generally rejected by mainstream business groups. This changed, however, with the recession of 1990-
93. Faced with business failures, weak domestic demand, and a declining and industrially passive union 
movement, business began to endorse a more aggressive approach to restructuring, productivity and 
union power.  
 
The Hawke and Keating governments had presided over significant government-driven industry 
restructuring, overcoming economic ‘rigidities’ for the sake of enhanced international competitiveness 
and more rapid capital accumulation. The Labor Government had gone as far as endorsing non-union 
enterprise bargaining and widespread privatisation. Business was thankful for these measures, but once 
Labor had shown that such changes could be made without serious union opposition, employers’ 
demands escalated. What was once only the stuff of employer pipe-dreams now became considered 
policy. Despite the restructuring that occurred under Labor, the scale of real wage reductions needed to 
restore profit rates to the levels prevailing in the 1950s and 1960s implied the destruction of a weakened 
but still powerful labour movement. By virtue of its organic links with the Australian union movement, 
this could not be achieved by the Labor Party.  
 
A frontal assault on labour was now required to boost the country’s flagging productivity record. 
Productivity in Australia increased during the 1980s and 1990s, but did so at a lower rate than was 
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achieved in the 1970s, which was in turn lower than that achieved in the 1960s (OECD, 1995). 
Furthermore, the growth in Australian labour productivity slipped behind the OECD average after having 
been higher than the mean in the previous decades. Finally, Australia’s relative failure to generate funds 
internally to sustain investment levels lay behind the chronic current account deficit and growing external 
debt. Reliance on overseas borrowing continually increased the deficit on income flows, which improved 
merchandise trade performance did nothing to correct. Now was the time to shift the tax burden further 
onto the shoulders of the working class in order to create a larger pool of national savings. 
 
The conservative Coalition parties moved in step with business and began to promote a hard right 
economic platform. The Fightback policy documents of 1992 openly sought to emulate the ‘New Zealand 
experiment’ (Kelsey, 1995), involving aggressive union-busting, high indirect taxes, extensive 
privatisation, cutting youth wages, the abolition of unemployment benefits and the gutting of the public 
health system (Hewson and Fischer 1992a, 1992b). Business was enthusiastic about this programme and 
provided both financial and political support before the 1993 election. 
 
The conservative offensive, however, galvanised the working class. The first site of struggle was the 
State of Victoria where these policies had undergone a trial run under the recently elected State Liberal 
Government of Jeff Kennett. Unions mobilised and called successive mass demonstrations and rolling 
strikes. Within one month of the Liberals’ victory, 150,000 workers marched on the streets of Melbourne 
in protest. While the union campaign was subsequently wound back by the State labour council, the 
success of the demonstrations and the widespread revulsion at the Fightback package encouraged the 
federal Labor Government to deploy a populist class rhetoric in the election campaign, depicting their 
opponents as representatives of the privileged and wealthy. There was an aggregate swing to the ALP in 
the 1993 election which was most pronounced in working class constituencies. 
 
Disillusionment with the Keating Government within the working class grew between 1993 and the 
following election, as Labor’s commitment to profits and growth rendered it incapable of overcoming the 
dissatisfaction of its own support base. Even though the worst of the recession had passed and growth 
reached five per cent, the consolidation of enterprise bargaining led to further intensification of work, and 
unemployment remained high, while the 1993 Budget cut tax rates for business still further. Labor 
promised to ‘bring home the bacon’ for workers who had suffered during the recession, but redundancies 
continued apace, privatisation was pushed further and students were hit harder with increased charges. 
By 1995 surveys predicted that Labor would be hit by large-scale defections of working class voters. The 
situation was described as Labor’s ‘voteless recovery’. Keating’s inner circle told itself that the economic 
situation was on track and better marketing of its policies would return Labor to office. In March 1996, 
the Government was confronted with the reality of its unpopularity when the ALP polled its lowest 
percentage primary vote since the 1930s (Bean and McAllister 1997) and was replaced by a conservative 
Government under John Howard which had learned from the mistakes of the 1993 election. The 
Coalition ran a campaign based entirely on attacking the record of the Labor Government rather than 
promoting its own policies, and was thereby able to tap into a broad vein of anger against the 
Government amongst even many of its working class supporters. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Australia’s economic performance under the Labor Government was far from exceptional internationally. 
The same can be said of Labor’s economic policies (Kuhn 1993; Frankel 1997; Fairbrother, Svensen and 
Teicher 1997). This common approach emerges from the guises of ‘globalisation’, ‘neoliberalism’, 
‘restructuring’ and ‘micro-economic reform’ (Australia), ‘structural adjustment’ (OECD), ‘free market’ 
reforms (Sweden), ‘internationalisation’ (Japan), ‘Thatcherism’ (Britain), ‘Reaganomics’ (the USA) and 
‘perestroika’ (the USSR). The major difference was that Australia pursued this agenda within a 
corporatist political framework, embodied in the Accord, which epitomised a social democratic approach 
to economic restructuring. But, during 13 years in office, Labor made very little progress in achieving the 
central goal of the social democratic project, improving the conditions of life for its working class base 
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within an expanding economy. The Labor governments in Australia were incapable of using the 
framework of capitalism and the capitalist state to achieve policies of full employment or income 
redistribution from the rich to the poor. Unemployment remained high and income was primarily 
redistributed to the wealthy.  
 
Labor’s failure to secure even modest goals associated the social democratic project is the main reason 
why the Party lost office and the electoral support of many workers. What is more, the social democratic 
approach to restructuring had partly anaesthetised the working class over a 13-year period, allowing the 
incoming Coalition surgeon felt confident to continue the operation, which benefited capital rather than 
labour, with a larger, blunter scalpel. 
 
The ALP is still a social democratic party. Its key support base is still amongst organised workers hoping 
that they can obtain a better living standard for themselves and their families within the framework of 
capitalism. The promise of the social democratic project in Australia dimmed for a period. But this was 
not the end for Australian social democracy, as subsequent experience has demonstrated.  
 
The new conservative Government proved both inept and incapable of solving the problems facing 
Australian capitalism. It could not insulate Australia from the effects of the Asian economic crisis which 
began in late 1997. Its attempt to divide working class opposition to its economic programme by stirring 
up crude racist sentiments towards Aborigines and migrants only succeeded in fostering the emergence of 
the hard racist One Nation Party which mainly took votes from the Coalition. The Howard Government 
even failed to achieve its more limited objective of dramatically weakening the union movement in early 
1998, when its attempt to smash the power of the national maritime union unleashed the largest display 
of working class industrial solidarity for nearly 30 years. As a consequence of these developments and 
stumbles, the conservatives suffered a reversal in public support. Labor became more credible as an 
alternative to the conservatives again and boasted of rapidly rising membership. 
 
Social democratic aspirations are therefore resilient. Parties such as the ALP are likely to be the main 
beneficiaries when workers’ self-confidence revives and the level of struggle picks up and when there is 
no challenge from the left to social democracy inside the working class. A future Labor government in 
Australia will not repeat the experiences of the Hawke and Keating Governments in exact form. But, 
whatever the specific policies adopted, the social democratic project has now become utopian, because 
the ALP remains committed to managing Australian capitalism and there are no signs that world 
capitalism, let alone its small Australian corner has overcome its tendency to experience deeper and 
deeper crises. It is likely, therefore, that the next Labor government will be no better for Australian 
workers than the last. Only the development of a coherent and sizeable revolutionary alternative within 
the Australian labour movement will prevent the continuation of the century-long social democratic cycle 
of high hopes being followed by bitter disillusionment and demoratlisation within its working class base. 
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Notes 
 
 
 
1 Thus in April 1997, the managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, argued on the basis of 
strong world economic growth in the mid-1990s that there was cause for ‘rational exuberance” (Courier 
Mail (Brisbane), 26 April, 1997). 
2 The average rate of profit in OECD countries increased from 12% to 16% between 1982 and 1993 
(Bell, 1997: 99). 
3 This case is argued forcefully in Australia by the Federal Government’s Bureau of Industry Economics 
(1995). 
4 See also Bryan (1995) and Bramble (1996a). 
5 These and all other data not otherwise referenced derive from Australian Bureau of Statistics 
publication Australian Economic Indicators (Cat. No. 1350.0), various editions. 
6 Bell (1997: 29-30) cites Kelly’s graphic description of the impact of the hour by hour currency collapse 
in 1986 on the deliberations of a Labor Cabinet meeting: “The Cabinet was infiltrated by a distinct mood 
of panic … It is doubtful if any budget meeting in the last twenty five years has been subjected to such 
pressure” (Kelly, 1992: 220).  
7 The two main conservative parties, the Liberals and National Party, have been in a Coalition whenever 
in government at the federal level after World War II, including the period since their electoral victory in 
March 1996. 
8 Singleton (1990) and Kuhn (1986), amongst others, have outlined the sequence of events in the labour 
movement, from the late 1970s, which led to the initial Accord of 1983. 
9 Hampson refers to Higgins (1980 and 1985) as an Australian proponent of ‘power resource’ theories of 
this type, but also see (Clegg et al 1986: 251). For some British exponents see Jessop (1982), Cameron 
(1984), and McLennan (1984). Korpi (1983) and Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1984) provide 
sympathetic social democratic accounts of the Scandinavian model which were influential in Australia. 
The approach is reviewed sympathetically but not uncritically by Kelly (1988), Chapter 9.  
10 Two major resource companies (Shell and CRA), for example, sponsored research by Kasper et al 
(1980) and Kahn and Pepper (1980) which expressed disappointment at the slow pace of “reform” five 
years into Fraser’s seven year term of office (Bell, 1997: 141). 
11 See Castles (1988) and Kuhn (1988). On manufacturing industry policy, see Capling and Galligan 
(1992) and Bell (1993). 
12 The effective rate of assistance is calculated as the percentage by which a country’s trade barriers 
(tariffs, quotas, subsidies and other protective devices) raise that industry’s value added per unit of final 
expenditure. 
13 Keating and Dixon (1989) and Gruen and Grattan (1992) are useful overviews of the Hawke 
Government’s program of restructuring, Stilwell (1986 and 1993) is often more persuasive. Also see 
EPAC (1988b and 1990) and Bell (1997). 
14 See EPAC (1992 & 1996) for more on the pattern of employment and unemployment under Labor. 
15 The Gini Coefficient (a measure of inequality that ranges between 0 and 1) for ‘income units’’ 
(essentially households’) gross income rose from 0.41 to 0.44 between 1986 and 1994 (ABS Australian 
Social Trends). 
 51 
 
 
References 
 
ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions/Trade Development Council) (1987): Australia 
Reconstructed Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 
 
Aligisakis, M. (1997): ‘Labour Disputes in western Europe: typology and tendencies’ International 
Labour Review, 136, 1 Spring 
 
Anderson, P. (1986): ‘Social Democracy Today’ Against the Current, 1(6), November-December, 21-28 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Monthly Summary of Statistics, 1304.0 
Australian Economic Indicators, 1350.0 
Australian Social Trends 1997, 4102.0 
The Labour Force, Australia, 6203.0 
Average Weekly Earnings, 6302.0 
Industrial Disputes, 6321.0 
Trade Union Statistics, Australia, 6323.0 
Trade Union Members, Australia, 6325.0 
 
Bean, C. and McAllister, I. (1997): The Politics of Retribution, , Sydney: Allen and Unwin 
 
Bell, S. (1992): ‘The Political Power of Business’ in S. Bell and J. Wanna (eds) Business-Government 
Relations in Australia, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Sydney. 
_____ (1993): Australian Manufacturing and the State: The Politics of Industry Policy in the Post-War 
Era, CUP, Cambridge. 
_____ (1997): Ungoverning the Economy: The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy, OUP, 
Oxford. 
 
Bennett, L. (1994): ‘Women and enterprise bargaining: the legal and institutional framework’ Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 36 (2), 191-212. 
 
Bennett, S. (1996): Winning and losing: Australian national elections Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press 
 
Bramble, T. (1989): ‘Award Restructuring and the Australian Trade Union Movement: A Critique’ 
Labour and Industry, 2 (3), 372-398. 
______ (1993): ‘Union-Management Co-operation in the Australian Vehicle Industry, 1983 to 1992’, 
Labour and Industry, 5 (1&2) 83-104. . 
______ (1995a): ‘Deterring Democracy? Australia’s New Generation of Full-Time Trade Union 
Officials’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 37 (3), 401-26 . 
______ (1995b): Enterprise Bargaining: A No Win Game for Workers, Socialist Alternative, Melbourne. 
______ (1996a): ‘Globalisation, unions and the demise of the labourist project: a critical review; Journal 
of Australian Political Economy 38, 31-62. 
______ (1996b): Asians are Welcome Here!, Socialist Alternative, Sydney. 
 
Bureau of Industry Economics (1995): International Benchmarking: Waterfront 1995, Report 95/16,  
Canberra: AGPS. 
 
Burford, M. (1983): ‘Prices and incomes policy and socialist policies', Journal of Australian Political 
Economy, No. 14. 
 
Bryan, R. (1995): The Chase across the Globe: International Accumulation and the Contradictions for 
Nation States, Westview, Colorado. 
 52 
 
 
 
Cameron, D. (1984): ‘Social democracy, corporatism, labour quiescence and the representation of 
economic interest in advanced capitalist society', in J. H. Goldthorpe (ed.): Order and Conflict in 
Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Capling, A. and Galligan, B. (1992): Beyond the Protective State: the Political Economy of Australia’s 
Manufacturing Industry Policy Melbourne: Cambridge University Press 
 
Castles, F. (1988): Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability Sydney: Allen and Unwin 
 
Catley, B. (1996): Globalising Australian Capitalism, , Melbourne: CUP 
 
Chapman, B. (1991): ‘Analysing the Impact of Consensual Incomes Policy on Aggregate Wage 
Outcomes: the 1980s Australian Experiment’, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 
No. 253, ANU, Canberra. 
______ (1996): ‘The Accord as a macroeconomic policy instrument: influences and changes over 1983-
96', paper presented to the "End of the Accord" conference, VUT, Melbourne, October. 
 
Childe, V. G. (1964): How Labor Governs, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne (originally pub. 
1923). 
 
Clegg, S., Boreham, P. and Dow, G. (1986): Class, Politics and the Economy, London : RKP 
 
Cliff, T. (1982): ‘The economic roots of reformism’ in T. Cliff Neither Washington nor Moscow: essays 
on revolutionary socialism Bookmarks, London 108-117 (originally pub. 1957). 
 
Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D. (1988): The Labour Party - A Marxist History London: Bookmarks 
 
Courier Mail: ‘Worldwide growth fills IMF with “rational exuberance”, 26 April 1997, p.59. 
 
Department of Industrial Relations (1995): Enterprise Bargaining in Australia: 1994 Annual Report, 
Canberra.: AGPS 
 
Dicken, P. (1992): Global Shift: the Internationalisation of Economic Activity (2nd edition), London: 
Chapman and Hall 
 
Dyster, B. and Meredith, D. (1990): Australia in the International Economy in the Twentieth Century, 
CUP, Cambridge. 
 
Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) (1988a): Trends in Profitability Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra. 
______ (1988b): An Overview of Microeconomic Constraints on Economic Growth Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
______ (1990): Micro Economic Reform Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
______ (1992): Unemployment in Australia, Council Paper No. 51. 
______ (1996): Future Labour Market Issues for Australia, Commission Paper No. 12, AGPS, Canberra. 
 
Esping-Andersen, G. and Korpi, W. (1984): ‘Social Policy as class politics in post-war capitalism: 
Scandinavia, Austria and Germany', in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed.): Order and Conflict in Contemporary 
Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Evatt Foundation (1995): Unions 2001: A Blueprint for Trade Union Activism, Sydney: Evatt 
Foundation 
 53 
 
 
 
Fahrer, J. and Pease, A. (1994): ‘International trade and the Australian labour market’, in P. Lowe and J. 
Dwyer (eds) International Integration of the Australian Economy, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney. 
 
Fairbrother, P. Svensen, S. and Teicher, J. (1997): ‘The Ascendancy of Neo-Liberalism in Australia’ 
Capital &Class 63 Fall. 
 
Fieldes, D. (1997): ‘Women’s wages and decentralised wage fixing: The Australian experience’, in T. 
Bramble, B. Harley, R. Hall and G. Whitehouse (eds): Current Research in Industrial Relations: 
Proceedings of the 11th AIRAANZ Conference. 
 
Frankel, B. (1997): ‘Beyond Labourism and Socialism: How the Australian Labor Party Developed the 
Model of “New Labour”’ New Left Review 221, January/February 3-34. 
 
Green, R. and Wilson, A. (1996): ‘The Accord and industrial relations: Lessons for political strategy', 
paper presented to the "End of the Accord" conference, VUT, Melbourne, October. 
 
Grossmann, H. (1970): Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems 
Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Neue Kritik. 
______ 1971: “Die Fortentwicklung des Marxismus bis zur Gegenwart” in H. Grossmann and C. 
Grünberg Anarchismus, Bolschevismus, Sozialismus: Aufsätze aus dem Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft 
Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlaganstalt, 281-336. 
 
Gruen, F. and Grattan, M. (1993): Managing Government: Labor’s Achievements and Failures , 
Melbourne : Longman 
 
Hampson, I. (1996): ‘The Accord: A post-mortem’, Labour and Industry, 7 (2), 55-77. 
 
Harman, C. (1991): ‘The State and Capitalism Today’ International Socialism 51, 3-54. 
______ (1993): ‘Where is capitalism going?’ International Socialism 58, 3-57. 
 
Harris, N. (1991): ‘A Comment on National Liberation’ International Socialism 53, 78-91. 
 
Hartnett, B. (1980): ‘Towards a counter-strategy for Labor’ in G. Crough, T. Wheelwright and T. 
Wilshire (eds) Australia and World Capitalism, Melbourne. 
 
Hewson, J. and Fischer, T. (1992a): Fightback! It’s Your Australia Liberal and National Parties, 
Canberra, November. 
______ (1992b): Fightback! Fairness and Jobs Liberal and National Parties, Canberra, December. 
 
Higgins, W. (1978): ‘The left social democratic challenge’, Intervention, No. 10-11. 
______ (1980): ‘Working class mobilisation and socialism in Sweden', in P. Boreham and G. Dow (eds.) 
Work and Inequality, Vol. 1, Macmillan, South Melbourne. 
______ (1985): ‘Political unionism and the corporatist thesis', Economic and Industrial Democracy, 6, 
349-81. 
 
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996): Globalisation in Question, Cambridge : Polity 
 
Horsman, M. and Marshall, A. (1994): After the Nation State, London: Harper Collins 
 
Hughes, B. (1981): ‘Trade unions, collective action and incomes policy’, in G. Evans, J. Reeves and J. 
Malbon (eds) Labor Essays 1981, Melbourne. 
 
 54 
 
 
Hunter, L. and Rimmer, S. (1995): ‘An Economic exploration of the UK and Australian experiences’, in 
J. Humphries and J. Rubery (eds) The Economics of Equal Opportunities, Equal Opportunities 
Commission, Manchester. 
 
International Labour Office (1997): World Labour Report 1997-98, Table 1.1 Trade Union Membership, 
ILO, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Jessop, B. (1982): The Capitalist State, Oxford: Martin Robertson 
______ (1990): State Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Julius, D. (1990): Global Companies and Public Policy, London: Pinter 
 
Kahn, H. and Pepper, T. (1980): Will She be Right? The Future of Australia, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia. 
 
Kasper, W. et al (1980): Australia at the Crossroads, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Sydney. 
 
Keating, M. and Dixon, G. (1989): Economic Policy in Australia: 1983-1988 Longman, Melbourne. 
 
Keating, P. (1990a): ‘Economic Statement’ February 1990, Canberra 21 February. 
______ (1990b): ‘Address … to the Metal Trades Industry Association (NSW Branch) Annual Dinner, 
Sydney’ 25 June. 
 
Keating, P. and Willis, R. (1985): Press Release 114, 4 September. 
 
Kelly, J. (1988): Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, London: Verso 
 
Kelly, P. (1992): The End of Certainty, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
 
Kelsey, J. (1995): The New Zealand Experiment, Auckland University Press, Auckland. 
 
Korpi, W. (1983): The Democratic Class Struggle, London: RKP 
 
Kuhn, R. (1986): Militancy Uprooted Socialist Action, Melbourne. 
______ (1988): ‘From one industry strategy to the next’ Politics 23 (2) November. 
______ (1989): ‘Labor in Power’ Arena 88 Spring 134-43. 
_____ (1993): ‘The Limits of Social Democratic Policy in Australia’ Capital and Class 51 15-51. 
______ (1997): ‘Grossmann on class struggle, beyond exegesis: a response to Lapides’ Science and 
Society 61 (2) Summer 236-243 
 
Kuhn, R. and O’Lincoln, T. (1989): ‘Profitability and economic crisis’, Journal of Australian Political 
Economy, 25. 
 
Langmore, J. (1996): ‘The Origins of the Accord', paper presented to the "End of the Accord" 
conference, VUT, Melbourne, October. 
 
Lenin, V. I. (1963): ‘In Australia’ in V. I. Lenin Collected Works Volume 19 Progress Publishers 
Moscow 216-7 (originally pub. 1913). 
 
Leys, C. (1996): ‘The British Labour Party’s Transition from Socialist to Capitalist’ Socialist Register 
1996, London: Merlin, 7-32. 
 
Lindblom, C. (1977): Politics and Markets, Basic Books, New York. 
 55 
 
 
 
Löfgren, H. (1988): ‘In Sweden, the fading promise of social democracy’ Arena 85, Summer pp85-92. 
 
Martin, H.-P. and Schumann, H. (1996): Die Globalisierungsfalle: Der Angriff auf Demokratie und 
Wohlstand Hamburg: Rowohlt 
 
Marx, K. (1977): Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
 
Mathews, J. (1986): ‘The Politics of the Accord', in D. McKnight (ed.) Moving Left: The Future of 
Socialism in Australia, Sydney: Pluto Press 
 
McLennan, G. (1984): ‘Capitalist state or democratic polity? Recent developments in Marxist and 
pluralist theory' , in G. McLennan et al (eds.) The Idea of the Modern State, Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press 
 
Merkel, Wolfgang (1993): Ende der Sozialdemokratie? : Machtressourcen und Regierungspolitik im 
westeuropaischen Vergleich, Frankfurt : Campus Verlag 
 
Miliband, R. (1969): The State in Capitalist Society, London: Quartet Books 
______ (1986): Socialist Register 1985/86: Social Democracy and After, London : Merlin 
 
Navarro, V. (1997): ‘The Decline of Spanish Social Democracy 1882-1996’ Socialist Register 1997, 
London: Merlin, 197-222. 
 
Ogden, M. (1984): ‘The Accord: intervening to deepen the democratic process’, Australian Left Review, 
No. 90. 
 
Ohmae, K. (1990): The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, London: 
Collins 
______ (1996): The End of the Nation State: New York : Free Press. 
 
O’Lincoln, T. (1993): Years of Rage: Social Conflicts in the Fraser Era, Melbourne: Bookmarks 
Australia 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1987): Structural Adjustment and 
Economic Performance OECD, Paris. 
______ (1989): Economies in Transition: Structural Adjustment in OECD Countries OECD, Paris. 
______ (1995): Employment Outlook, Paris. 
 
Panitch, L. (1980): ‘Recent theorizations on corporatism: reflections on a growth industry', British 
Journal of Sociology, 31 (2), 159-87. 
 
Petras, J. (1987): ‘The Contradictions of Greek Socialism’ New Left Review, 163, 3-25 
 
Pontusson, J. (1992): ‘At the End of the Road: Swedish Social Democracy in Crisis’ Politics and Society, 
20(3), September, 305-332 
 
Pusey, M. (1991): Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes Its Mind , 
Melbourne : Cambridge University Press 
 
Reich, R. (1992): The Work of Nations, Vintage Books, New York. 
 
 56 
 
 
Roper, B. (1990): ‘What’s Wrong with the Treasury Line’ New Zealand Monthly Review, 324, 
April/May 
 
Ross, G.; Hoffmann, S.; Malzacher, S. (eds) (1987): The Mitterand Experiment: Continuity and Change 
in Modern France, Oxford: Polity 
 
Ross, L. (1987): ‘Sisters Are Doing It for Themselves . . . and US’ Hecate 13 (1) 
 
Scott, A. (1991): Fading Loyalties Sydney: Pluto Press 
 
Shaikh, Anwar M. and Tonak, Ahmet E. (1994): Measuring the wealth of nations: the political economy 
of national accounts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Sharkey, L. (1943), Australia Marches On Communist Party of Australia, Sydney. 
 
Sheehan, P., Pappas, N. and Ching, E. (1994): The Rebirth of Australian Industry, Victoria University of 
Technology, Melbourne. 
 
Singleton, G. (1990): The Accord and the Australian Labour Movement Melbourne : Melbourne 
University Press. 
 
Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises (1994): 
Second Annual Report Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
 
Stilwell, F. (1982): `Towards an Alternative Economic Strategy', Journal of Australian Political 
Economy, 12-13. 
______ (1986): The Accord and Beyond Sydney: Pluto. 
______ (1993): ‘Wages Policy and the Accord’ in Greg Mahony (ed.) The Australian economy under 
Labor Sydney : Allen and Unwin, pp65-86. 
 
Stopford, John M. and Susan Strange (1991) Rival states, rival firms : competition for world market 
shares, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Visser, J. (1989): European trade unions in figures Deventer Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 
 
Wilks, S. (1996): ‘Class compromise and the international economy: The rise and fall of Swedish Social 
Democracy', Capital and Class 58, 89-111. 
 
Winspear, W.R. (1915): Economic Warfare, Sydney : The Marxian Press. 
 
 
